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Abstract
Foreign investments have evolved over the past two decades to become the most critical business strategies for
many companies. While developed countries have been the originators of more than 86% of foreign investment
outflows, they receive only 65% of foreign inflows. By contrast, inward investments for developing countries
have risen from 28% in 1990 to 53% in 2012. This increase is the result of a growing perception among
recipients that attracting FDI to their nations contributes to technology transfer, which enhances human capital
formation, leading to reduced income inequality and sustainable economic growth. Therefore, the purpose of this
paper is to examine the aforementioned perceptions in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a developing nation.
The study is based on a mail survey of 123 companies, personal interviews with 12 executives, and the review of
documents from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Annual World Investment, IMF, OECD,
UAE Ministry of Economy reports, and several local agencies. The findings indicate that there has been a
significant transfer of technology to the UAE, which has had a positive impact on human capital formation.
However, evidence of the relationships between technology transfer and income inequality or economic growth
is inconclusive.
Keywords: technology transfer, income inequality, human capital formation
1. Introduction
Today, the geographical patterns of corporations are clustered around a multitude of connections to diverse
businesses across borders, barriers of discipline, and jurisdictions. This reflects a growing complexity in the
mode of corporate decision making in which the traditional make-or-buy decision is intertwined with Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and Outsourcing (OS) (Lowe & Taylor, 1998; Harrison, 1994; Gandolfi, 2009; Lonsdale
& Cox, 2000).
These two phenomena have become the most critical business strategies in developed nations for the past two
decades. From 1990 to 2012, FDI flows increased more than eightfold from $208 billion to $1.8 trillion (United
Nations, 2013). During the same period, almost 80% of manufacturing, 50% of IT, 43% of business processes,
and 7% of knowledge work were outsourced by more than 94% of the Fortune 500 companies (Schaltegger &
Wagner, 2012), and this is expected to grow by 4.65% over the period 2012–2016. While these two strategies are
interspersed with numerous political and economic issues, they are presumed to be the ultimate proxy for global
competitive success. Yet, they both require effective integration into the world’s economy.
According to Helpman (1984), Markusen (1995), and Markusen and Venables (1999), companies integrate into
the global economy by transferring work to external providers, or they may be resident in one country with a
lasting interest in another country through Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment (HFDI) or Vertical Foreign
Direct Investment (VFDI). HFDI duplicates home country-based operations with a more efficient value chain in
a host country via mergers and acquisitions, whereas VFDI performs value-added activities by contracting out
fragments of product operations (commonly called OS). An extension of VFDI that may involve a source
country investing in an entirely new enterprise in a host country is referred to as Greenfield FDI, while exporting
to a third nation is known as platform FDI.
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Still, the success of these investments in a host country is generally measured in terms of the amount of inflows
and the number of projects based on two assumptions. First, the host government encourages foreign investments
and offers incentives that are summed up as altering governments’ foreign investment restrictions. According to
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in the 1990s, more than 94% of 1,000 government
investment regulations and laws were revised to improve FDI inflows (such as greater liberalization and the
promotion and facilitation of foreign investment). In addition, from 2000 to 2007 more than 2,540 national
regulatory bodies were altered to promote foreign investment (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, 2008).
Second, in a relatively non-distorted and convivial environment, FDI and OS contribute to human capital
formation, which leads to reduced income inequality and ultimately greater sustainable economic growth. The
foundation of these assumptions is based on two mechanisms: the scale or the magnitude of investments and the
level of technologies transferred that form the human accumulation of competencies, knowledge, and creativity
to perform labor in order to produce economic value. The aggregate of economic value leads to the well-being of
a population, which collectively results in reducing income inequality and rising sustainable economic growth
(Baldwin et al., 1999; Kokko, 1996).
The extent to which these two mechanisms hold depend on a set of complex questions in developing nations:
i. How can we bridge the gap between existing technology and new technology transferred by foreign
investors?
ii. Does the transferred technology have a positive impact on human capital formation?
iii. Does enhanced human capital formation reduce income inequality?
iv. Does a government positively influence the transfer of new technologies?
v. Is there a high level of consensus among government authorities regarding technology transfer?
vi. Does a significant regional-political risk hinder the transfer of new technologies?
Although the literature on various aspects of FDI is extensive, few investigations have aimed to answer these
questions. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to investigate the aforementioned questions in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), a developing nation. This country is selected as it has undertaken rapid trade linearization with
the objective of increasing the level of FDI in favor of human capital formation, income inequality and
sustainable economic growth.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section focuses on the distinction between FDI and OS to
provide the key issues related to international investment and the transfer of technology in a multilateral trading
system. Then, it presents the magnitude and rapid pace of FDI and OS followed by their proliferation in
developing nations. Finally, this paper addresses the abovementioned research questions by testing six related
hypotheses in the UAE.
2. Comparison of FDI and OS
Blinder (2009) believes that although FDI and OS are deeply intertwined in international trade and has become
the most recurring schemes in developed, developing, and transition economies, their differences have received
relatively little attention. By comparing these two business schemes, we can draw a number of conclusions:
1). FDI is an investment made by a company or entity based in one country into a company or entity based in
another country. It takes different forms, such as cross-border mergers and acquisitions, franchising, joint
ventures, license agreements (horizontal integration), setting up subassembly facilities or an entire supply chain
(vertical integration), and sourcing subassemblies from foreign suppliers by ceasing the production of
intermediate inputs, choosing instead to buy parts from unaffiliated firms located in foreign countries
(Hornberger et al., 2011). HFDI can be a substitute for trade when production in the host country replaces
exports, but it would be complementary to trade when a part of the production in the host country is shipped
back to the home country (VFDI). VFDI can also be considered to be an alternative to OS, and this is divided
into two types. Backward VFDI is when the overseas sales of a company serve as inputs for the downstream
operations of domestic companies, whereas forward VFDI is when there is investment into a foreign industry
that sells the output of a company’s domestic production processes (International Monetary Fund, 2011).
Nonetheless, OS is the manifestation of the increased fragmentation of existing standard products and services
into their constituent parts. This is defined as decoupling, which allows companies to spread production across
countries (Grossman & Helpman, 2005; Modarress & Ansari, 1990, 2008).
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2). FDI is an investment associated with a foreign company calculated as the sum of long-term and short-term
equity capital that reflects the objective of establishing a permanent interest. Once FDI is established, increases
can take the form of injections of additional equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings not distributed as
dividends by subsidiaries or associated enterprises and undistributed branch profits, and various intercompany
claims (such as the extension of suppliers’ credits or loans). Additional capital is primarily driven by sharing
resources (Levina & Ross, 2003), maximizing profits, production process efficiency, strategic capability
positioning (Grossman & Helpman, 2003, 2005), access to low-wage low-skilled labor, improved product
quality (Loh & Venkatraman, 1995), increased global competition and faster responses to peaks and changes in
production, and less investment in back-up equipment (Barney, 2010). By contrast, OS is a practice of having
certain job functions carried out under contract with an outside supplier for fixed costs sale by the ordering
company with low upfront investment (Blinder, 2009; Modarress et al., 2010).
3). An FDI corporate structure operates in the host country by setting up a subsidiary or associate company in the
foreign land. By contrast, an OS corporate structure resides in the home country and is influenced by the scope
of offshore suppliers’ inputs into the final product, their resource networks, process knowledge, and technology
to execute jobs efficiently and effectively.
4). FDI control and ownership is based on at least 10% of the voting power with the intention to influence the
production, distribution, and business decisions of the investor in the host country. Markusen (1995) states that
control, ownership, and bargaining power depend on either the extent of tangible assets such as patents and,
technology or the magnitude of intangible assets (e.g., trade secrets and reputation for quality) that confers some
valuable market power or cost advantage. Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005) state that ownership is strongly
associated with governments’ statutory restrictions on the level of technology transferred. They also state that the
level of technology replicates R&D intensities, professional and technical skills, leading-edge products, and
product differentiations. Nevertheless, OS companies have no control or ownership over their supplier in the host
country and are neither in a partnership nor in a long-term relationship.
5). FDI assets are easily transferred to the host country, and foreign investors have legal rights t o patent their
products, trademarks, and capital knowledge as well as technical and associated services. Thus, the protection of
intellectual property or intangible assets in the host country is more critical than OS. Dickinson (2005) and Reed
(2005), in a study of 99 companies, observe that 64% of firms cite intellectual property as the concern for their
company not OS since the protection of intellectual property is not granted. Emphasis is on jeopardizing the brand
integrity by the licensee when the contract is terminated (Kokko, 1996; Barney, 2010). Although OS
arrangements have the potential to involve product development, they require extensive training companies to
avoid disclosing any intellectual property (Modarress & Ansari, 2007).
6). While sharing operating costs and profit and making mutual contributions are common practices, HFDI
reduces costs by duplicating the home-based products and processes in the host country. Grossman and Helpman
(2003) state that FDI, costs of capital, transfer of technology, and knowledge capital are considerably higher than
OS. While the primary focus of OS is on cost reduction, decisions are based on minimizing the production costs
explicitly driven by transferring functions to entities beyond the perimeter of the principal organization
(Modarress & Ansari, 2010). Willem (2001) believes that cost is the crucial difference between FDI and OS.
7). FDI is based on a two-directional fund flow, namely inwards and outwards. Inward investments are reserves
by non-resident investors in the reporting country, while outward investments are cross-border trades transferring
funds to businesses with higher prospects for growth by direct investors resident in the reporting country. On the
other hand, OS is a one-directional flow where the funds flow from home countries to suppliers for conducting a
function (Feenstra, 1998).
8). FDI relates to a significant amount of tangible and intangible assets (Markusen, 1995); thus, firms hire fewer
skilled workers to protect technology from spillover to the host country. This is the most commonly practiced
means of foreign investment, which plays an important role as an engine of employment, technological
development, productivity enhancement, economic intensification, and, more importantly, as an instrument of
technology transfer from developed to developing countries. OS, on the other hand, requires higher skill workers
compared with FDI, thus creating positive spillovers in host countries (Modarress & Ansari, 2007).
9). Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003) consider convenience to be a trade-off between OS and FDI. Since
FDI’s ultimate relationship with overseas partners is inundated with regulations linked to the legal framework of
the host nation and contractual incompleteness, the final product and efficiency gained from OS are more
convenient. Almonte and Bonassi (2004) support this conclusion, stating that final goods producers are sensitive
to the degree of contract incompleteness in a host country, implying that OS is more advisable.
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10). The resilience of FDI to financial crises (Tong & Wei, 2010) is much higher than that of OS. The flexibility
of FDI flows during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, Mexican crisis of 1994–1995, East Asian crisis
of 1997–1998, and recent global economic crisis of 2008–2009 clearly document the lack of access of
financially-constrained domestic firms to global capital markets.
These differences provide a broad perspective for initial investments and for the efficient utilization of the
development process.
3. Growth in FDI and OS
The magnitude and rapid pace of FDI and OS have been well documented in the past two decades. Inward and
outward FDI fluctuated throughout the 20th century. Worldwide annual FDI flows increased from $60 billion in
1985 to $315 billion in 1995. This expansion continued to a record total of $2.09 trillion in 2007, resulting in a
cumulative stock of nearly $18 trillion (World Bank, 2009).
Consequently, with average growth at an annual rate of 5.4%, manufacturing and service investments grew by
more than 79,000 multinational companies, including 650 state-owned organizations. Their income increased
from $184 billion in 2000 to $580 billion in 2008, an average annual growth of 9.7% (UNCTAD, 2011).
However, in the wake of the global economic crisis, related to the Eurozone crisis, United States ‘fiscal cliff’,
and various international FDI policy changes, flows came to a temporary halt in 2008 and 2009. Global inflows
fell by 18% to $1.73 trillion in 2008 and to less than $1 trillion in 2009, affecting all the major developed,
developing, and transition economies. Based on data for 54 countries (20 developed and 34 developing
countries), global inflows contracted by 49% in the first half of 2009 compared with the same period in 2008.
Sharp declines were recorded in all constituent components of FDI and OS. Cross-border mergers and
acquisitions were the most affected with a 66% decrease in 2009 compared with 2008. The number of
international Greenfield projects also declined markedly (by 23%).
A significant reduction in employment during this period was also seen. Worldwide employment by US
multinational companies decreased by 0.4% in 2008 to 33.4 million workers. Employment in the United States
by US parent companies decreased by 1.3% to 22.9 million workers as well (USDC, 2010). In 2009,
international employment by US multinational companies decreased by 4.1% to 31.3 million workers, with
decreases in both the United States and abroad. Employment in the United States by US parent companies
decreased by 5.3% to 21.1 million workers, which mirrored the percentage change in total private-industry
employment in the United States.
However, FDI global inflows rose by 16% in 2011, surpassing the 2005 to 2007 pre-crisis level to reach $1.2
trillion. The world market also recorded 13,718 projects, an increase of 5.6% on 2010, which created 2,265,006
jobs, 2.5% more than in 2010. Growth increased to $1.4 trillion in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2012), while it is estimated
that the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions will reach $1.8 trillion and $1.9 trillion in 2013 and 2014,
respectively (UNCTAD, 2012). The same pattern was seen in corporate employment, with estimated direct job
creation increasing by 2.5% to 2.27 million in 2011, followed by a 3.5% increase in 2012 and in 2013.
OS has become equally lucrative, evolving from contractual preparations confined to the procurement of
non-core competences to core competencies cutting across all industries (Lonsdale & Cox, 2000). A study by the
Center for Urban Economic Development finds that US imports of business, professional, and technical services
associated with offshore OS increased by 77% between 1997 and 2002. The study indicates that with the growth
of a globally interconnected economy, firms constantly reassess their core competences in the new business
context to rapidly respond to the global market (Palugod & Palugod, 2011).
Rooted in these reassessments, the revenue of the global OS market expanded from $45.6 billion in 2000 to
$76.3 billion in 2005 and grew to $95 billion in 2008. The global network of multinational corporations
generated approximately $16 trillion from international production and foreign sales in 2010, which accounted
for over a quarter of global GDP (World Bank, 2011).
Global OS revenue increased by 8% in 2010 and by 6% in 2011. By 2012, more than 94% of the Fortune 500
companies, which accounted for 70% of global trade, outsourced 80% of manufacturing, 50% of IT, 43% of
business processes, and 7% of knowledge work. While developed countries had a 79% market share (North
America 53%, United Kingdom 16%, Europe 10%), the share for developing nations was only 21% (India 9%,
Asia Pacific 5%, Latin America 5%, Middle East and North Africa 2%), Prabhakar (2011).
4. FDI Trends in Developing Nations
The share of the world inflow of FDI in developing nations increased from 31.2% during 1988–1992 to 35.5%
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from 1993 to 1998 (UNCTAD, 2000) and it remained relatively resilient in 2012. During this period, the total
reached $684 billion, $130 billion more than developed countries. These data show that while in 2007 developed
nations represented 84% ($1.8 trillion) of global outflows and in 2009 about 81% ($1.5 trillion), developing
nations contributed only 12–13% and transition economies 2.4% of total outflows in 2007 and 3.1% in 2009.
This represents an increase of 317% from 1995 to 20009 (UNCTAD, 2008, 2011; Ernst & Young’s
Attractiveness Survey, 2012). Table 1 shows the top 10 developing nations for world inflows.
Table 1. Top ten destinations of foreign investments in Middle East
YEAR

2011

2012

% Change

Egypt

44

1524

50%

Nigeria

45

17

62%

Oman

48

18

63%

Bahrain

48

24

67%

Kenya

55

29

42%

Qatar

59

38

36%

Morocco

70

48

31%

Saudi Arabia

135

72

47%

South Africa

154

74

52%

United Arab Emirates

328

169

48%

Source: Data calculated using unctadstat.unctad.org. The Intelligence, 2013.

Primary FDI grew 12-fold, manufacturing increased by seven and half times, and services grew more than
17-fold from 1991 to 2007. The increase in the number of multinational corporations was complemented by an
increase in the number of projects and total FDI value in the Middle East. The number of multinational
organizations rose to more than 80,000 globally with more than 800,000 foreign affiliates spread across the
world employing an estimated 69 million workers, who generated $28 trillion in sales and $7 trillion in value
added. This represented a 9% increase from 2010. According to the United Nation Investment Report (2012),
high-income developing economies received more flows than any other development group for most of the
period, in part because new investment is more productive in countries with vast markets, natural resources, a
skilled workforce, and well-developed infrastructure.
FDI in developing nations and regions such as the Middle East rose rapidly by resource-seeking investors. With
a vast supply of petroleum reserves and a total population of 394,460,000, the number of annual FDI projects
increased from 362 in 2003 to 1,070 in 2008. From 2003 to 2011, 6,740 projects worth $809.6 billion were
created, which contributed to the creation of more than 1.1 million jobs in the Middle East. Of these projects, 41%
were carried out in the construction and energy sectors, 47% in the business services sector, and 12% in the
manufacturing sector. According to FDI Intelligence (2012), the Middle East was ranked the number five
destination in terms of number of FDI projects in the world behind large continents such as Europe with 4,639
projects, North America (1,892), Latin America/Caribbean (1,364), and Asia (1,270).
During the 2010s, about 59% of the total FDI inflow to the Middle East has thus far come from Western Europe
and North America; however, the trend has been shifting towards intra-regional investments. As a result, this has
first created a strong partner ranking, with the fourth largest investment in the region ahead of many developed
countries such as France and Germany. Second, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar have been exerting an increasing
influence on FDI projects with a rise in the share of total projects from 14% in 2007 to 24% in 2011. Natural
resources, especially petroleum, were the leading sector with an estimated $35 billion capital investment,
followed by metals and minerals with $27 billion, which increased by 67% in 2010, and construction. In terms of
project distribution, financial and business services were the top sector, accounting for 33% of all projects
recorded in the Middle East, with a growth of 3% in 2011. Yet, minerals were the leading sector with an
estimated 57,000 jobs created (38% of growth in 2011).
4.1 Growth in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries
In 2011, the political turmoil that resulted from the Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East led to 80% losses in
the volume of FDI in Libya, 80% in Yemen, 29%, in Egypt, 26%, in Syria, and 14% in Tunisia. As a result, GCC
countries became the leading destination for projects. Since 2003, about 79% of projects in the Middle East,
which represents 62% of total value and 65% of jobs, have moved to GCC countries including Bahrain, Kuwait,
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Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. From 2003 to 2010 alone, inflows into GCC increased by over 3800%,
outpacing developed nations by a significant margin as shown in Table 2. The inflow trend continued to increase
in 2011 and 2012 (Office of The Chief Economist, The World Bank, Report No. 57517, and Economic
Integration in the GCC, 2010). Among GCC nations, the UAE was the most attractive country for investments,
ranking 38th globally, followed by Kuwait (41st), Bahrain (43rd), Qatar (49th), Oman (54th), and Saudi Arabia
(56th).
Table 2. Inward for GCC (in millions of US dollars), 2003–2011
Country

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Bahrain

6,720

7,354

8,276

11,191

12,947

14,741

14,998

15,154

2011
15,935

Kuwait

384

408

645

773

945

8,722

10,332

11,235

10,765

Oman

2417

2460

4132

5720

9152

11680

13142

14217

15005

Qatar

3456

4655

7155

10655

15355

17769

25894

30564

30477

Saudi

18512

20454

33535

50659

73480

110200

142300

170450

186850

UAE

6604

16608

27508

40314

54500

68224

72227

77727

85406

Sources: UNCTAD (http://unctadstat.unctad.org).

4.2 Growth in the UAE
In 2004, FDI inflows into the UAE were about $9 billion and the IMF projected $10.3 billion for 2005.
According to the 2005 UNCTAD Inward FDI Performance Index, the UAE ranked 34th out of 141 other
countries worldwide and number five among Arab nations in attracting FDI. The UAE inflows grew at an average
annual rate of 64%, from $0.5 billion in 2000 to $12.6 billion in 2006.
In 2010, the UAE attracted 368 FDI projects, which was 13.9% higher than that in the previous year and resulted
in creating 22,166 additional jobs. While Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the largest Emirates, are the leading Emirates,
the country’s attractiveness as an FDI destination stems from its growing infrastructure, strategic location, and
access to the growing African and Middle Eastern markets.
In the past, FDI has been directed towards the development of petroleum resources (representing 73% in 2005).
However, the strategic need to further reduce economic dependence on the oil and gas sector through economic
diversification has created additional business opportunities. For example, in terms of value and number of
projects, business manufacturing accounted for 20%, trade 17%, business services 16%, real estate 12%, and
other services 11% followed by transport, storage, and communication at 10% and financial at 9%. The
government services sector has also made an integral contribution to the UAE’s non-oil GDP (11%). With
regards to manufacturing, the primary producer is Abu Dhabi, which represents almost half of the UAE’s
manufacturing sector, followed closely by Dubai with a share of 33% and Sharjah with 11%.
Despite a sharp decline in most other Arab countries because of political unrest and the global downturn,
increasingly larger shares of FDI have been allocated to various sectors, which reflect the diversity of the UAE,
and this has continued to increase. Capital flows into the UAE surged by nearly 40% to more than $7 billion in
2011. In 2012, UAE inflows were $8.2 billion, which represents 23.7% of its GDP. The significant difference
between GCC and the rest of the developing nations was the amount of FDI outflows to developed countries.
While the amount of inflows surpassed outflows from 2000 to 2011, the UAE matched inflows with outflows in
2012. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority manages more than $627 billion in sovereign funds (third in the world
after Norway and Saudi Arabia), comprising financial assets, real estate, and other investments in foreign
countries. In 2013, the UAE claimed an even higher position in the latest AT Kearney Global FDI Confidence
Index as a result of the growing perception among UAE authorities that attracting FDI contributes to technology
transfer, which enhances human capital formation, leading to reduced income inequality and a diversified
economy.
5. Purpose and Methodology
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate and describe the perceptions among regulators that attracting
FDI contributes to technology transfer, which adds to the formation of human capital, leading to reduced income
inequality and a diversified economy. The study, as a consequence, is exploratory and qualitative in nature. Three
citations are most often offered in the organizational literature to support a given study’s methodological
justification (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984). These authors all suggest that qualitative
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methods should be used in research areas (e.g., FDI in a developing country ) that are pre-paradigmatic in nature,
namely no theoretical framework from which to make predictive hypotheses, per se, have been advanced in the
literature. However, the following six general propositions can be advanced from the literature regarding
technology transfer to the UAE:
P1: Significant effort is required to bridge the gap between the existing technology and technology transfer to
the UAE.
P2: The technology transferred has had a positive impact on human capital formation in the UAE.
P3: The technology transferred has reduced income inequality in the UAE.
P4: There has been a positive influence on transfer technology through UAE government policies.
P5: There has been a high level of consensus among UAE authorities regarding technology transfer.
P6. Significant regional and political risks exist that hinder technology transfer to the UAE.
Three primary methods of data collection were employed in this study. First, we reviewed internal documents
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Annual World Investment studies,
data from the IMF, the OECD, data compiled by the UAE Ministry of Economy, and several local agencies and
internal reports produced by private corporations. Second, 14 qualitative interviews were conducted with
officials and executives in private sectors in the companies listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Company name
Company name
1. Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
2. Etihad Airways
3. Abu Dhabi Airport Company
4. National Bank of Abu Dhabi
5. United Arab Emirates Central Bank
6. Ministry of Labor
7. National Oil Company
8. Offset Program
9. Dubai Logistics City
10. Dubai Port
11. Global Aerospace Logistics
12. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank
13. Sharjah Islamic Banks
14. Mubadala

Finally, the information from the interviews was used to design a six-part field survey questionnaire to gather
more in-depth information to assess the stated propositions. In January 2013, 200 questionnaires were sent to 123
public and private companies. Respondents were asked to voluntarily complete the questionnaire and were given
assurance of anonymity (i.e., individual responses would not be revealed, only aggregate numbers). Complete and
usable questionnaires were returned by 123 respondents, which represented a response rate of 61.5%.
Approximately 43% of respondents were supervisors; 18% were second-level management, 27% were directors;
and 12% were senior executives of their business units. Based on the annual revenues, the company size was
grouped into three categories: annual revenues less than $100 million; revenues between $100 million to $500
million; and revenues greater than $500 million, as shown in Table 4. The majority (52%) of respondents had
annual revenues of less than $100 million; 25% reported revenues between $100 million and $500 million, and
about 23% reported revenues greater than $500 million.
Table 4. Company size
Revenues

Percentage of Respondents (%)

Less than $100 million

52

$100 million – $500 million

25

Greater than $500 million

23
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6. Results and Discussion
P1: Significant effort is required to bridge the gap between the existing technology and technology transfer to
the UAE.
According to Philip et al. (2001), advancement in technical areas depends on a number of factors including
future regional economic arrangements, international intellectual property and protection, the character of future
multinational corporations, and the role and amount of public and private sector R&D investment.
The survey findings show that significant effort is required to bridge the gap between the existing technology in
the UAE and technology transfer by foreign investors. This proposition is the greatest concern cited by
respondents in the study. Table 5 shows the number of respondents that numerically rated the significance of each
proposition using a scale of 1 (‘low’), 2 (‘moderate’), and 3 (‘significant’).
Table 5. Responses to the six propositions
Number of

Degree of Importance a Propositions

a

Respondents (n=123)

1(%)

2(%)

3(%)

(P1) There is a difference between existing technology and technology transfer

97

4

12

84

(P2) There is a positive impact on human capital formation through technology transfer

100

4

10

77

(P3) There is a positive impact on income inequality through technology transfer

98

24

5

71

(P4) The UAE government has a positive influence on technology transfer

96

8

27

65

(P5) There is a high level of consensus in the UAE about technology transfer by FDI

95

34

43

23

(P6) There are political challenges facing foreign investors in the UAE

95

14

32

54

Categories: (1) ‘Low’, (2) ‘Moderate’, and (3) ‘Significant’.

Nearly 84% of survey respondents indicated that without doubt there is a significant difference between the
existing technology in the UAE and the new technology transfer, while 12% stated a ‘moderate’ difference. Only
4% of respondents indicated a ‘low’ difference (Table 5). Thus, the difference between existing technology and
technology transfer is supported (P1).
The interviews with executives showed that during the past decade, the UAE has made significant technological
progress but mainly focused within universities and government organizations. However, the technology gap
between UAE partners and investors remains wide (P1). They believe that UAE partners have expanded their
capabilities through the transfer and diffusion of technologies in different areas through four channels: (i)
vertical linkages (backward and forward) with suppliers; (ii) horizontal linkages with aerospace companies; (iii)
the migration of skilled labor; and (iv) the internationalization of R&D (Modarress and Ansari, 1990).
According to the executives, technology developments are divided into four areas: energy, materials, ICT, and
genetics. They stated that technology transfer during the past decade has brought the UAE highly effective and
economically productive dependencies on successive waves of ICT, energy sources of petroleum, natural gas,
and to some degree nuclear power. Alternatively, 49% of respondents (Figure 1) indicated that the UAE is more
advanced in energy technology. Still, 42% specified that more development has been made, while 9% believed
there has not been a noticeable development in energy technology advancements. In ICT, 76% believed that
there has been a significant development in the UAE, while 17% indicated reasonable development and 7%
claimed that the development has not been noticeable.
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Figure 1. Technology deevelopment inn UAE, 2002–22012
However, by comparingg technology ddevelopment inn materials annd genetics wiith energy andd ICT, accordin
ng to
respondennts, the developpments have nnot been noticceable. For exaample, the exeecutives in thee UAE’s aerosspace
sector em
mphasized that aircraft com
mponents are ccomplex and require sets oof resilient m
materials, adva
anced
technologyy, and ICT neccessary for dessign, productioon, and testingg. Moreover, higher performaance, speed, power
consumptiion, and cost are key facttors, while visibility, interooperability, annd informationn sharing are also
necessary. Hence, the UA
AE has had to change its existing technological structuree as well as traiin all employees on
this new teechnology andd its procedurees and processses. The execcutives explainned that theree are three steps to
changing ttheir technologgical structure, namely developing a primarry roadmap, iddentifying the pproduct that will be
the focus oof the roadmapp, and periodiccally reviewingg and updatingg the technologgy.
The Strataa-Mubadela Aeerospace Com
mpany owned bby the UAE goovernment, whhich is a partnner with the Bo
oeing
Company for the 787 Dreamliner,
D
firsst started buildding the infrastructure for thhe primary roaadmap to defin
ne the
scope andd boundaries of the projecct requirementts defined byy Boeing. Thiis step includded identifying
g the
necessary hardware andd software to meet the projject requiremeents. Boeing, for example, requires Muba
adela
Aerospacee to comply with its harddware and software requirements for accessing, sharring, and viewing
informatioon.
ment of technnology based on the requireements outline
The seconnd step involvved the designn and developm
ed in
purchasingg accessible teechnology and assistive techhnology produccts. Subsequenntly, this involvved identifying the
internal tecchnology systeems that needeed to be updateed to increase aaccessibility.
Third wass the periodic review to maaintain the tecchnology and create strong partnerships aamong the various
groups of suppliers andd customers. Fourth, increasing awarenesss at all levels among emplooyees related to
o the
availabilityy and accesssibility of neew technologiies and to prroviding trainning in desiggn, manufactu
uring,
maintenannce, and repair.
P2: Techn
nology transfeer has had a poositive impact on human cappital formationn in the UAE.
In general, human capitaal developmennt represents thhe skills embodied in humann beings basedd on their abilitty to
absorb knoowledge on traansferred technnologies. Schuultz (1961, 19775) defines poositive technoloogy transfer ass the
movementt or flow of teechnical know
wledge, inform
mation, designss, prototypes, materials, invventions, and trade
secrets froom their creatorr to users to bee applied and eexploited for thhe purpose of enhancing hum
man knowledge.
Human caapital formatioon is dividedd into skilled and less skiilled categoriees. Dunning ((1993) states that
efficiency--seeking invesstors require lless training aand that assett-seeking inveestment is perrceived to be less
beneficial to human capital
c
formatiion than marrket-seeking iinvestment. H
However, the adoption of new
technologiies requires exxtensive traininng and inputs from the laboor force. Highh-level capital goods need to
o be
combined with labor thhat is able to uunderstand and work with tthe new technnology. Thereffore, technolog
gical
spillover iss possible onlyy when a certaain minimum leevel of skilledd human capitaal is available iin the host cou
untry
(Modarresss et al., 2013)..
The execuutives interview
wed stated thaat while the pproliferation oof technologiess in the UAE has overcome the
obstacles oof time and sppace during thhe past decade, it has creatted a fertile ennvironment foor the formatio
on of
human cappital. Human capital
c
formatiion in the UAE
E seems to bee the result of government ppolicies designed to
attract FD
DI to the counntry. Once inddividuals are eemployed by multinational corporations’ subsidiaries, their
116

www.ccsennet.org/ijef

Inteernational Journaal of Economicss and Finance

Vol. 6, No. 7; 2014

knowledgee is enhanced further througgh training onn the application of advanceed technologiees in areas suc
ch as
aerospace and petroleum
m. The results oof the survey sshowed that appproximately 777% of responddents indicated
d that
they experrienced a signif
ificant positivee impact on huuman capital foormation only after technologgy transfer thrrough
FDI. Abouut 10% reporteed this to be m
moderate impaact and only 44% a low impaact, as shown in Figure 2. Thus,
T
technologyy transfer has had
h a positive impact on hum
man capital forrmation, suppoorting P2.

80%
Impactt Human Capittal
Formattion
Reducees Income Ineqquality

60%
40%
20%
0%
Signnificantly M
Moderate
High

Veery Low

Figure 2.
2 Impact of teechnology transfer on humann capital and inncome inequaliity
Several exxecutives alsoo stated that foreign affiliaates diffuse ttechnology annd skills to ddomestic suppliers,
customers, and entities with which tthey have direect and indireect dealings. IIn particular, bbackward link
kages
between fooreign affiliatees and domesttic firms are im
mportant for enhancing techhnology dissem
mination. To en
nsure
that local inputs meet thheir stringent ttechnical requuirements, foreeign affiliates ooften provide local suppliers not
just with specifications but also witth assistance in order to inncrease their technological capabilities. Such
assistance tends to be more
m
prominennt in certain inndustries suchh as petroleum
m, aerospace, aand manufactu
uring,
where knoowledge transffer has had a positive impaact on supplieers’ competitivveness. This iis one of the main
reasons for the UAE risiing in the Interrnational Hum
man Developm
ment Index from
m 0.443 in 19880 to 0.818 in 2013
(41st out oof 187 countriies). This findding suggests tthat technologgy transfer hass had a positivee impact on hu
uman
capital forrmation in the UAE, especiallly with regardds to labor prooductivity in thhe petroleum, ffinance, real estate,
transportattion, and manuufacturing secttors (P2).
P3: The teechnology trannsferred has redduced income inequality in tthe UAE.
In theory, the relationsship between FDI and income inequalitty has been eexplained as the modernization
hypothesiss and dependenncy hypothesiss. The modernnization hypothhesis treats forreign capital annd domestic ca
apital
as homogeeneous goods.. The inflow oof foreign capital attracts laabor to a host country, addss to gross dom
mestic
investmennt, and fosters economic groowth. Growthh in turn leadss to a reductioon in income inequality (Lin &
Tomaskovvic-Devey, 20111). The UAE
E Department of Labor (20112) supports tthis hypothesiss by reporting
g that
expatriatess comprise abbout 96% of w
workers in thee country. Theese workers m
maintain close ties to their home
h
countries and send backk remittances to the countrry of their oriigin. This reacched $30 billiion in 2012 (UAE
Exchange Center, 2013). According to the World Bank (2012), the value off remittances transferred am
mong
developingg nations moree than quadruppled from 20022 to 2012.
The depenndency hypothhesis, on the other hand, aargues that fooreign investm
ments are harm
mful to develo
oping
economic growth by exxtracting labor and surplusess from the thiird world. Whhile FDI attraccts labor, it disstorts
developingg countries’ domestic
d
laborr skills and thhe formation of human cappital, thereby increasing inc
come
inequality (Hein, 1992)). Consequentlly, socially annd economicaally, FDI transslates into greeater disparitie
es of
wealth, as 17% of the world’s
w
populaation consumess 80% of its reesources, leavving almost fivve billion peop
ple to
live on thee remaining 200%. Specificallly, 1.2 billion of the world’ss population nnow lives on leess that $1 perr day,
another 1.88 billion on leess than $2 perr day, 800 milllion are hungryy every day, annd more than 60,000 human
ns die
each day ffrom hunger (U
United Nationss Human Deveelopment Repoort, 2012).
In this stuudy, 71% of suurvey responddents rated thee impact of tecchnology transsfer on incom
me inequality in
n the
UAE to bee significantlyy high. The intterviews also sshowed that teechnology trannsfer stimulateed by multinattional
companiess reduces inccome inequalitty, which suppports P3. Y
Yet, many exeecutives, durinng the interviews,
commenteed that the difffusion of technnology has a nnegative correelation with inccome growth among 90% of
o the
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population and a positive correlation with income growth among richer groups. In other words, it helps the rich
get richer, while the poor get poorer. About 5% of respondents considered technology transfer to have had a
moderate impact on income inequality. Still, 24% said that technology transfer has had a low impact on income
inequality in the country, as shown in Figure 2.
The executives also believed that surging oil prices, which generate more than 70% of nominal income, have led
to a turnaround in the UAE’s economic fortunes and a return to some of the big spending that has characterized
the country since the 1970s. Between 1973 and 2009, the UAE’s GDP increased from $2,800 billion to more than
$266,000 billion and it is estimated to reach $358.9 billion by 2014 with a per capita GDP value of $64,840
(Ministry of Finance and Industry, 2008). The IMF (2008) ranked the country’s per capita income 15th in the
world in 2007, while the Central Intelligence Agency ranked its per capita GDP 14th in the world and second in
GCC after Qatar in 2009. Despite this revenue, about 10% of the population falls into the lowest household
income group, with another 10% in the highest income group. In conclusion, the result does not fully support the
influence of foreign investment on labor income inequality in the UAE (P3).
P4: There has been a positive influence on transfer technology through UAE government policies.
According to neoclassical economic theory, business entities are driven by profit incentives that result from
efficiency and economies of scale. Country enticements are the most convincing factors that influence flows.
The UAE’s inducements are grouped into seven main categories: 1) Infrastructure incentives, especially
transportation and communication networks; 2) Resource endowments, including natural and human resources;
3) Sizeable GDP, measured by GDP per capita and sustained growth in these markets measured by the growth
rates of GDP; 4) Macroeconomic stability, signified by stable exchange rates and low rates of inflation; 5)
Government stability; 6) The government’s favorable policies and fiscal and monetary incentives in the form of
tax concessions; and 7) Regional groupings and preferential trading arrangements between prospective
recipients of FDI.
USAID (2005) reports that the UAE attracts investors to fulfill four objectives: market seeking, resource seeking,
and strategic asset seeking. The most important motives are the size of the regional market, the extent of host
country exports, and its integration with neighboring and international countries (Markusen, 1995). Under
resource seeking, the markets previously served by companies are protected by government restrictions and trade
barriers. These types of business relations could easily be related to OS since it requires low-cost and specialized
labor, while VFDI is provoked by their need to access cheap energy. Finally, strategic asset seeking occurs when
companies accept investments, joint ventures, acquisitions, or alliances to promote their long-term strategic
objectives. The main difference between resource seeking and strategic asset seeking is that the company aims to
obtain certain foreign resources to improve the quality of its offering, provide new features to its products, and
significantly increase its market share (Lim, 2005).
However, the UAE government enforces restrictions subject to its legal framework, which may hinder FDI. The
areas of restrictions are: 1) General restraints on entry, where at least 51% of the share of the company must be
held in the Emirates; 2) Distributions, expatriates are excluded from distributions; 3) Landownership restrictions,
limitations on expatriates’ ability to purchase land; and 4) Labor market restrictions. This includes local agent
requirements in government procurement, restrictions on lending to expatriates, no business outside free zones,
blocking capital and profit repatriation, and discriminatory tax treatment. The profit of foreign banks is also
subject to a profit tax levied by local authorities at an annual rate of 20% (Documents by Central Bank of Abu
Dhabi; Department of Labor, and Ministry of Interior).
The majority of executives interviewed indicated that government policy plays a critical role in the transfer of
technology. About 65% of respondents agreed that government policies have a significant positive influence on
technology transfer (P4). They provided a list of 14 government-supported incentives (Table 6) for attracting
technology transfer. Moreover, new investment laws and regulations are evolving and these are expected to
become more conducive to foreign investment and new technology diffusion. The executives also mentioned the
establishment of Free Zones and a Logistics City as part of the strategy to attract more investment in order to
diversify the UAE economy. This strategy has contributed to 33% of Dubai’s GDP, with 19,000 firms and 26,000
employees. Free-zone employees, who contribute to export and re-export figures, were valued at $5.6 billion in
January 2012, an increase of 4.7% in comparison with January 2011; however, they are confined to low-tech
highly labor-intensive activities. Low skilled jobs are also allocated to repetitive manufacturing, aluminum,
cement, logistics, shipping, and trades.
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Table 6. Factors attracting
Factors attracting
1. Central location in Persian Gulf Coastline Nations
2. Located on Persian Gulf maritime route
3. 4th largest oil reserves and 5th largest gas reserves
4. Comfortable sovereign wealth ($627 billion)
5. Well-developed infrastructure: roads,
6. Good governance above MENA levels in
7. Strong logistics cluster; distribution
8. Development in human capital
9. High internationalization of firms
10. Developed financial market
11. Easy customs procedures
12. Member of GCC, OPEC, WTO, airports, ports, and communication and GAFTA
13. Fixed rate and no restrictions political stability, regulatory quality, on foreign loans
and remittance and control of corruption of foreign loans
14. No taxes on capital gain, and and shipping companies investment inco

About 27% of respondents rated that the government has a moderate influence on technology transfer, while 8%
believed that it has a low influence. The executives also listed 25 factors (Table 7) that hinder foreign investment.
Therefore, investors face numerous existing government restrictions that encumber foreign investment in the
UAE (P4). In particular, government restrictions concern landownership, limited business ownership, restrictions
on natural resources, critical infrastructure, and military projects that require government review and approval.
Table 7. Factors hindering
1. Lack of innovation capability
2. Low female participation in the workforce
3. Low nationals with the skills demanded by the private sector, national reliance on government support
4. Burdensome rules (49% to 51%) for starting business and restrictions on entry by foreign direct investors
5. No governing compensation if expropriations were to occur
6. No insolvency laws; no competition laws; no standard accounting
7. Limited investor protection, no right to private ownership and establishment, limited access to financial resources above 15 million AED
8. Economic reliance on hydrocarbon exports
9. International sanctions on Iran,
10. struggles to insulate itself from regional disruption triggered by the Iranian nuclear power
11. Global financial crisis and the UAE Dirham tie to the US$
12. Weak convertor industries
13. Shallow cluster of R&D
14. Bureaucratic management and a lack of transparency in government
15. The role of the state in the economy and price control
16. Societal instability due to the disproportionately high ratio of foreign labor and income inequality
17. Lack of commitment to international environment and labor rules
18. Political violence in neighboring countries
19. Lack of commitment to bilateral investment rules, subtle expropriation of gained returns
20. Hostile attitudes of elites and society towards the FDIs
21. Internal terrorist attacks, conflicts with foreign workers, and the increasing number of radicalized Emirati youth
22. Reluctance to reveal reliable information
23. Limited capacity in ports and handling expected –large number of containers for petrochemical products (400 containers per week)
24. Costly supply and distribution services
25. Secrecy of most political and economic activities

Furthermore, according to the executives, the three most problematic factors for highly-intensive labor
investments (such as manufacturing) are ‘restrictive labor regulations’, ‘access to financing’, and ‘an inadequately
educated workforce’. This is particularly true for manufacturing, port operations, and maintenance. In conclusion,
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P4 is not fully supported.
P5: There has been a high level of consensus among UAE authorities regarding technology transfer.
Technology transfer through FDI has raised serious concerns and doubts among top UAE management
(Modarress & Ansari, 2007). Only 23% of respondents indicated a significant level of consensus among UAE
authorities regarding technology transfer by FDI compared with 43% that expressed a moderate level and
34% a low level.
The executives mentioned that UAE authorities are concerned about the implications of having an international
investment agreement that lays down common standards for national investment policies and which requires
each signatory to be bound to its rules. Being bound to national policies under a multilateral agreement would be
viewed by the country as going even further towards pre-empting a country’s right to manage inflows in the
short-term, medium-term, and long-term. The impact on the monopolization of the domestic market and the
government’s ability to manage the economy are other major concerns. More importantly, there is growing
concern about sustainability in the negotiation of international investment agreements. UAE authorities are
concerned that investment agreements interfere with their sustainable development strategies. As the result, the
government has recently revised bilateral treaty agreements, renegotiating old agreements, putting on hold the
conclusion of any new agreements, and even terminating several existing agreements, particularly in petroleum,
military projects, and critical infrastructure. In addition, the country fears that the exploitation of natural
resources and influence on trade relations with neighboring nations will soon see it lose its competitive
advantage. The executives listed 12 concerns about the implications of influencing foreign investment in the
UAE (Figure 3). In conclusion, P5 is partly rejected.
P6: Significant regional and political risks exists that hinder technology transfer to the UAE.
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Figure 3. UAE concern issues about FDI
Political risks, which are the combination of the values and ideologies of most emerging nations inherited from
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their centralized economies, are the most challenging factor (Modarress et al., 2010; Dunning, 1993). Generally,
investors fear that their enterprises may lose their competitive advantage by having a business in a conflict-zone
economy. About 54% of respondents rated political challenges as significant. Those who have already invested
in the UAE and are well aware of the country’s politics, especially the geopolitical hotspots of Iran,Iraq, Kuwait,
Bahrain, and Yemen as well as Egypt and Syria, stated that they have no plans to withdraw their investments
from the UAE. Yet, they are unlikely to have future plans since their investments seem to be affected not only by
the uncertain impact of political crises but also by military interventions. On the other hand, 32% of respondents
rated the political risks as moderate and 14% rated them as low.
The executives also fear the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in the UAE when nearly 100 members of a local
Islamist Al-Islah group were detained on charges of plotting a coup in April 2013. This was the second time in
2013 that the authorities had reported a specific threat from this Islamist militant group. In December 2012, UAE
security forces arrested a cell of UAE and Saudi Arabian citizens which were planning attacks in both countries
and other states, according to state news agency WAM. The UAE is also at risk of being caught up in any military
conflict over Iran’s disputed nuclear program, while Dubai is under pressure to limit its trade links with Iran. Any
heightened tension in the Iran nuclear dispute or more sanctions on Iran could affect the UAE’s economy. In
addition, this makes the country a potential target for hosting several US military facilities (Kelly & Stansfield,
2013).
In the interviews, the executives highlighted the regional environment as a key area of concern and supported the
hypothesis that significant political risks are involved in investments in the UAE (P6). The executives insisted that
manifestations of political risk should be calculated in any foreign investment in this region. They added that
although the country has escaped the serious regional unrest that has shaken the Arab world, it is still struggling to
insulate itself from regional disruptions. Indeed, this region has undergone several political transformations and
challenges and these might continue in the future.

Macroeconomic deterioration
Financial vulnerability,
Weaknesses in infrastructure
Liquidity risk
Market risk
Credit risk
Strategic risk
Compliance risk
Operations risk
Country risk
0%
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Figure 4. Regional risks of technology transfer through FDI
According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2003), eight areas of risk are associated with FDI
activities in this region. These risks, in order of importance, are: 1. Country risk, namely political and
socioeconomic factors; 2. Operations risk, deficiencies in information systems or internal controls; 3.
Compliance risk, offshore vendors having inadequate privacy regulations and compliance with and the
appropriateness of investment policies and procedures; 4. Strategic risk, a lack of government protection; 5.
Credit risk, an issuer or counterparties fail to perform on an obligation to the investor; 6. Market risk, financial
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condition resulting from adverse changes in the value of holdings arising from movements in interest rates,
foreign exchange rates, equity prices, or commodity prices; 7. Liquidity risk, an institution cannot easily sell,
unwind, or offset a particular position at a fair price because of inadequate market depth; and 8. Legal risk,
contracts are not legally enforceable. The majority of respondents (47%) rated the country risk as the highest risk
in the UAE, followed by 42% for operations risk, 39% for compliance risk, 37% for strategic, 32% for credit, 28%
for market, 26% for liquidity, 25% for weakness in infrastructure, 23% for financial vulnerability, and 18% for
macroeconomic deterioration (Figure 4).
7. Summary
Today, corporate structures are clustered around a multitude of cross-border connections to diverse businesses.
This reflects the growing complexity of business decision making in which the traditional make-or-buy decision
is intertwined with FDI and OS. Although these two strategies have been widely implemented for more than two
decades, little is known about their differences. Reviewing the literature clearly points to 10 differences between
FDI and OS. First, foreign investment is a business venture involving a long-term relationship, while OS relates
to contracting out internal businesses to third-party organizations. Second, FDI is a category of asset that reflects
a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) investing in another economy, whereas OS is the
manifestation of the increased fragmentation of existing standard products and services into their constituents
relocated to a foreign company. Third, the corporate structure of FDI operates outside the country but the
corporate structure of OS resides in the home country. Fourth, foreign investment ownership and control is
strongly associated with the percentage of investment (minimum 10%), whereas OS has no control over
suppliers in the host country. Foreign investors also have legal rights t o patented products, trademarks, and
equity capital as well as technical and managerial services in the host country, while these rights are not granted
with OS. Fifth, the relationship of foreign investments with overseas partners is inundated with regulations linked
to the legal framework of the host nation and the country’s contractual incompleteness. Therefore, the final
goods product and efficiency gained from OS is clearly preferred. Sixth, OS decisions are based on operating
costs, which are explicitly driven by transferring them to entities beyond the perimeter of the principal
organization, whereas all operating costs are shared by multinational corporations under foreign investment. In
particular, HFDI reduces costs by investing, yet duplicating, its home-based products and processes in the same
value chain stage in a host country. Seventh, while FDI flows are bidirectional (inward or outward), the flow of
resources is one way from the vendor to the supplier with OS. Eighth, assets are easily transferred to the host
country, whereas an OS arrangement does not involve transferring assets. Ninth, the bargaining power of
multinational corporations is higher under FDI in comparison with OS. Tenth, the resilience of FDI during global
financial crises is much higher compared with OS.
This striking feature of FDI has laid the foundation for shifting the perspectives of 54,000 transnational
corporations to developing nations, which now have $3.4 trillion invested in about 449,000 foreign affiliates
throughout the world. From 1993 to 1998, the share of developing nations’ world FDI inflows increased to 35.3%
compared with an average of 31.2% from 1988 to 1992. Moreover, FDI flows to developing economies
remained relatively strong in 2012, reaching $684 billion, meaning that developing economies absorbed an
unprecedented $130 billion more than developed countries.
Since 2005, FDI has gained momentum in the Middle East and has gained the largest share of total FDI value
globally. The Middle East attracted 6,740 projects worth $809.6 billion, contributing to the creation of more than
1.1 million jobs between 2003 and 2010. Of the Middle East countries, the UAE was the largest destination for
FDI projects. Between 2003 and 2010, the UAE attracted 44% of projects, has 19.6% of the FDI value, and
accounts for 30.6% of the jobs created. In 2011, the UAE attracted 368 FDI projects, the highest in the Middle
East, registering an increase of 13.9% compared with 2010. These projects created 22,166 jobs in the country,
which is the highest in the Middle East.
The UAE’s attractiveness as an FDI destination stems from many factors including its petroleum resources,
infrastructure, a relatively stable economy, and about nine million multicultural expatriates. Nevertheless, a
number of imperative questions have remained unanswered. Our interviews with 12 public and private sector
executives involved with FDI and OS decisions and implementation were used to provide objective answers to
the questions regarding attracting investors to UAE. These questions were as follows:
1). How can we bridge the gap between existing technology and new technology transferred by foreign
investors?
2). Does the transferred technology have a positive impact on human capital formation?
3). Does enhanced human capital formation reduce income inequality?
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4). Does a government positively influence the transfer of new technologies?
5). Is there a high level of consensus among government authorities regarding technology transfer?
6). Does a significant regional-political risk hinder the transfer of new technologies?
The executive interviews and survey allowed us to draw the following conclusions. First, although there are
significant differences between existing technology and the technology transfer (P1) required by foreign
investors, the technology has improved exponentially during the past decade. Furthermore, all executives
commented that disparity among technologies requires four steps in improving the existing technology structure:
developing a primary roadmap, identifying the product that will be the focus of the roadmap, and periodically
reviewing and updating the technology and procedures. Second, technology transfer has a positive impact on
human capital formation (P2). Third, technology transfer and the formation of human capital do not reduce
income inequality in the UAE (P3). Fourth, the UAE government’s investments, laws, and regulations are
evolving and they are expected to become more conducive to foreign investment. The executives listed 14
factors that positively influence FDI and OS in the UAE. However, they also listed 25 factors that hinder foreign
investment. Therefore, some degree of unease definitely exists among UAE authorities regarding technology
transfer. Sixth, some political risks exist (P6); however, the large market potential coupled with investment in
infrastructure and abundant natural resources make UAE a natural choice for consideration by foreign investors.
Overall, the respondents commented that the UAE government’s incentives attract foreign investment to those
areas where job opportunities, education levels, or standards of living are lagging. However, they are concerned
about the implications of having international investment agreements that lay down common standards for
national investment policies and that require each signatory to be bound to its rules.
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